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THE DOUBTFUL OMNISCIENCE OF APPELLATE COURTS
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT*

For a good many years my colleague, Leon Green, has been
pointing out that:
Probably the strangest chapter in American legal history is
how in the short period of the last fifty or seventy-five years, the
same period during wluch trial courts were, losing most of their
power, the appellate courts have drawn unto themselves practically all the power of the judicial system.1
In a recent statement of his views Dean Green has observed, with
much justification
The trial judge is not much more than a trial examiner, while
the jury sunply satisfies the public and professional craving for
ceremonial-the necessity for dealing with simple matters as
though they were freighted with great significance.2
The principal means by which appellate courts have obtained
such complete control of litigation has been the transmutation of
specific circumstances into questions of law. Subtle rules about presumptions and burden of proof, elaborate concepts of causation and
consideration and the rest, have been devised in such a way that
unless the appellate judge handling the case is a dullard, some
doctrine is always at hand to achieve the ends of justice, as they
appear to the appellate court.
Dean Green's analysis seems to me unanswerable. The purpose
of the present article is to call attention to certain recent developments which add further support to his thesis. Within the last
decade the appellate judges have become bolder. No longer do they
hide their assumption of power beneath an elaborate doctrinal superstructure. Instead today's appellate courts are inventing new procedural devices by which their mastery of the litigation process can
be made direct rather than devious.
I propose herein to discuss four such devices review by the
appellate court of the size of verdicts, orders for a new trial where
the verdict is thought to be contrary to the clear weight of the
evidence; refusal to be bound by findings of fact of the trial judge
based on documentary evidence, and expanded use of the extraordi* Member of Minnesota Bar. Associate Professor of Law, University of
Texas.
1.

Green, Judge and Jury 380 (1930).

2. Green, Jury Trial and Mfr. Justice Black, 65 Yale L. J. 482, 486

(1956).
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nary writs of mandamus and prohibition to control the trial court
in its discretionary actions as to the procedure by which a case is
to be handled. After these four devices have been discussed, some
evaluation of the wisdom and significance of this recent development
in judicial administration will be attempted.
REVIEW OF THE SIZE OF VERDICTS

"

There was a time when the law as to appellate review of the size
of verdicts might have been simply stated. Of course the appellate
court could reverse for legal error, as when the verdict exceeded a
maximum fixed in the statute, 4 or the jury was improperly instructed as to the measure of damages.5 And if the verdict was the
product of passion and prejudice, the appellate court could intervene.6 But it was clearly established in federal court, and generally
true also in state courts, that, in Holmes' phrase, "a case of mere
excess upon the evidence is a matter to be dealt with by the trial
7'
cou rt.
The day when the law could have been so simply stated is not
really very long past. As recently as 1945 Judge Goodrich, speaking
for the Third Circuit, could say
The members of the Court think the verdict is too high. But they
also feel very clear there is nothing the Court can do about it.
A long list of cases in the federal courts demonstrates clearly
that the federal appellate courts, including the Supreme Court,
will not review a judgment for excessiveness of damages even
in cases where the amount of damage is capable of much more
precise ascertainment than it is in a personal injury case. 8
Very few scholars would have disagreed with that statement when it
was made. But the law has changed so completely in the last twelve
years that today Judge Goodrich's statement seems no more than a
legal museum piece-to be studied with the same awe for the de3. This section of the article is based generally on DeParcq and Wright,
Damages under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 17 Ohio St. L. J. 430,
466-83 (1956)
4. See Southern Railway-Carolina Division v. Bennett, 233 U. S.80, 87
(1914).
5. E.g., Thompson v. Camp, 163 F.2d 396 (6th Cir. 1947), cert. denied.
333 U. S.831 (1948). That case is discussed in DeParcq and Wright, note 3
supra, at 459-60

6. Minneapolis, St.P & S.S.M. Ry. v. Moquin, 283 U.S. 520 (1931).
And see the famous statement of Chancellor Kent in Coleman v. Southwick,
9 Johns. R. 45, 6 Am. Dec. 253 (N.Y. 1812).
7 Southern Railway-Carolina Division v. Bennett, 233 U.S. 80, 87
(1914).
8. Scott v. Baltimore & 0. Ry., 151 F.2d 61, 64-65 (3d Cir. 1945).
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parted past as one might give to trial by battle, or to a nicely drawn
replication de injura.
In the twelve years since Judge Goodrich spoke ten of the
eleven federal courts of appeals have announced that when a
verdict seems excessive to the appellate judges, there is something
they can do about it.9 And even the Eighth Circuit, the only holdout
to date, shows signs of wavering in its loyalty to the ancient faitl. 10
Supreme Court decisions stating squarely that a verdict may not be
reviewed on the ground that it is excessive have been blithely cast
aside as "an old procedural impediment" which "no longer bars
judicial review."' 1 The Seventh Amendment might have been
thought to give difficulty, for it provides that "no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States,
than according to the common law." And the Supreme Court long
ago said that "motions for a new trial based on the ground that the
damages allowed by the verdict are excessive" present "purely a
question of fact, not determinable by any fixed and certain rule of
law," and that such motions were submitted to the legal discretion
of the trial court, which could not be reviewed.1 - But these difficulties
were readily surmounted. As Professor Moore, who supports review of the size of verdicts, concedes
Recently, the courts of appeals faced with the question of review
have generally ignored the Seventh Aendment issue.l
It may be worthwhile to note-since this paper is concerned with
the methodology of appellate courts rather than with the specific
question of whether the size of verdicts ought be reviewable- that
eight of the ten courts of appeals which have recently discovered a
lutherto-unknown power to review the size of verdicts have an9. See Hulett v. Brinson, 229 F.2d 22, 23-25 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert.
dented, 350 U.S. 1014 (1956), Ballard v. Forbes, 208 F.2d 883. 888 (1st Cir.
1954), Comiskey v. Pennsylvania IlR., 228 F.2d 687, 688 (2d Cir. 1956),
Trowbridge v. Abrasive Co. of Philadelphia, 190 F.2d 825, 830 (3d Cir. 1951),
Virginian Ry. v. Armentrout, 166 F.2d 400 (4th Cir. 1948), Vhiteman v.
Pitrie, 220 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1955), Sebring Trucking Co. v. White, 187 F2d
486 (6th Cir. 1951), Bucher v. Krause, 200 F.2d 576, 586-88 (7th Cir. 1952),
cert. dented, 345 U.S. 997 (1953), Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 186 F.2d 926
(9th Cir.), cert. dented, 341 U.S. 904 (1951), Chicago, R.L & P Ry. v.
Kifer, 216 F2d 753, 757 (10th Cir. 1954), cert. denmd, 348 U.S. 917 (1955).
These cases are discussed m DeParcq and Wright, note 3 supra, at 467-70.
10. Compare National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co. v. Sorensen,
220 F.2d 858, 861 (8th Cir. 1955), with Chicago G. W Ry. v. Casura, 234
F2d 441, 448-49 (8th Cir. 1956).
11. Bucher v. Krause, 200 F.2d 576, 586 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. dented,
345 U.S. 997 (1953).
12. Metropolitan
L. v. Moore, 121 U.S. 558, 574-75 (1887), cf.
Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830).
13. 6 Moore, Federal Practice 3827 (2d ed. 1953).
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nounced this discovery by way of dicta in cases where they found
the verdict before them not excessive. 14 It is interesting to speculate
why these courts did not defer resolution of this controversial
and novel claim of appellate power until a case arose in which the
point was necessary for decision.
Developments in state courts in the last decade have been less
dramatic, perhaps because state appellate courts, not being confined
by the Seventh Amendment, have always had more leeway to deal
with verdicts that seemed to them "flagrantly outrageous.""1 The
possibilities open to state courts are indicated by the practice in
Missouri, where the appellate court overtly measures the verdict below, not against the evidence in the record as to the damages suffered,
but against awards it has itself permitted in the past in what seem
to it comparable cases.",
The most striking state court development has come in two cases,
decided one week apart in the spring of 1955, by the Minnesota
Supreme Court. As recently as 1950, that court said
To warrant our overturning the verdict on appeal, the damages
awarded must so greatly exceed what is adequate as to be accountable on no other basis than passion and prejudiceY.'

And in 1954 the court had refused to set aside the verdicts in a case,
though characterizing them as "liberal" and saying
we would have been better satisfied had the trial court reduced them.

is

But in 1955 the court was confronted with the case of Oscar
Ahlstrom, a twenty-six year old man who had been awarded
$275,000 for injuries causing a complete motor and sensory paralysis of the lower half of his body The verdict was attacked as
"grossly excessive and the result of passion and prejudice on the
part of the jury" The Supreme Court, after making its own extensive review of the facts, ordered a remittitur of $100,000."
14. Of the cases cited in Note 9 supra, the statements about the possibility of review of denial of a new trial because of excessive damages are
dicta, in all except the decisions from the Fourth and Fifth Circuits.
15. E.g., Union Pac. Ry. v. Hadley, 246 U.S. 330 (1918) And see
DeParcq and Wright, note 3 supra, at 473-76. The "flagrantly outrageous"
gloss on Chancellor Kent's rule will be found in, e.g., Bartlebaugh v. Pennsylvania R.R., 78 N.E.2d 410, 414 (Ohio App. 1948), and Allied Van Lines,
Inc. v. Parsons, 80 Ariz. 88, 98, 293 P.2d 430, 436 (1956)
16. Comment, Power of the Appellate Courts of Missourt to Order
Reuittitur in Unliquidated Damage Cases, 17 Mo. L. Rev. 340 (1952).
17 Flemming v. Thorson, 231 Minn. 343, 353, 43 N.W.2d 225, 231
(1950). Accord, Goss v. Goss, 102 Minn. 346, 113 N.W 690 (1907).
18. Cameron v. Evans, 241 Minn. 200, 210, 62 N.W.2d 793, 799 (1954)
19. Ahlstrom v. Minneapolis, St.P & S.S.M. Ry., 244 Minn. 1, 68
N.W.2d 873 (1955).
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Certain elements in the AhIstrom decision are worthy of comment. Most important is the court's express statement.
We find no passion or prejudice on the part of the jury in
arriving at its verdict.20
Instead the jury's error had been in accepting plaintiff's figures
as to damages demanded
without appreciating that they were predicated upon an inadequate or improper factual foundation in each instance.2 1
The sources to which the jury is to go in appraising the factual
foundation for claims of damage are left unclear. Thus the court
concedes that the only testimony in the record as to the future cost
of a daily attendant for plaintiff is an expert opinion that this will
amount to $10 a day. But the court, apparently on some theory
of judicial notice, calls this figure "unrealistic" and says it is "unreasonable" to suppose competent attendants are not available in
Thief River Falls for less than this sum.22
Again, the court does not indicate the process of computation,
or even the theory, on which it found that the verdict was excessive
by a suspiciously-exact $100,000. The jury's verdict may have
been based on an "inadequate or improper factual foundation,"
as the court claims, but the award which the court permits is based
on no visible factual foundation whatever.
Finally, and most significant for purposes of the present discussion, the court's action, so far as can be told from the authorities it
cites, is utterly unprecedented. If there has ever before been a
case where the Supreme Court of Minnesota ordered a remittitur
in the absence of passion and prejudice, it does not appear from the
AhIstrom opinion. Indeed in every case cited by the court to support its statement as to the proper scope of review of damages, the
verdict in question was affirmed! Thus the remittitur here does
not rest on the precedents but on the court's ipse dixit discovery
that
we do not forfeit our recourse to common sense and social
practicality in given cases
and that
judicial care must be exercised lest a fatal financial burden
be placed upon the industry out of sympathy for the plaintiff.3
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 30, 68 N.V.2d at 891.
Ibid.
Id. at 28-29, 68 N.WV.2d at 890.
Id. at 27, 68 N.W.2d at 889.
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One week later the Minnesota Supreme Court took similar
action. Plaintiff, who had recovered a verdict of $170,000 for
the loss of an arm at the shoulder and a claimed back injury, was
required to consent to a remittitur of $65,000, or else be faced with
a new trial.24 In ordering the remittitur the court said
We find no evidence of passion and prejudice by the jury in
arriving at its verdict. Apparently the excessive verdict resulted merely from reliance solely upon mathematical formulas
without testing the reasonableness 2of5 the amount awarded from
the standpoint of its over-all effect.

Thus it now seems clear that in Minnesota, passion and prejudice
are not longer conditions to appellate action, and that old notions
that it is for the trial judge to decide whether the verdict is excessive are gone. Instead the appellate court will apply the "test of
reasonableness in the light of its over-all effect" to the verdict,
and will order a remittitur if, in its judgment, this test is not met.
What accounts for this remarkable change of view in both
state and federal courts as to the reviewability of damages which
the last decade has seen? Many of the courts have relied on the
final sentence of a United States Supreme Court opinion, otherwise devoted entirely to substantive issues, where the Court said
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the amount of danages awarded by the District Court's 26judgment is not monstrous in the circumstances of this case.
This has been read by eager appellate judges as meaning that they
can set aside verdicts if they are "monstrous. 27 The conclusion is
weakened, however, by the facts that (a) the court of appeals had
said nothing about the verdict as being "monstrous" or otherwise
excessive, (b) the railroad had not claimed in the Supreme Court
that the damages were "monstrous" or otherwise excessive, and
(c) a casual adjective in an opinion devoted to other issues seems
28
an unusual way of overruling a long line of authortes.
24. Hallada v. Great Northern Ry., 244 Minn. 81, 69 N.W.2d 673, cert.
denzed, 350 U.S. 874 (1955).
25. Id. at 99, 69 N.W.2d at 687
26. Affolder v. New York, C. & St.L. R.R., 339 U.S. 96, 101 (1950)
27 See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 186 F.2d 926, 931 (9th Cir.),
cert. dented, 341 U.S. 904 (1951).
28. See DeParcq and Wright, note 3 supra, at 471-72. In two recent
cases the Court has reversed courts of appeals which found judgments below
excessive, though without reaching the question of whether the appellate
courts have power to set aside verdicts on this ground. Neese v. Southern Ry.,
350 U.S. 77 (1955) , Snyder v. United States, 350 U.S. 906 (1955) See
DeParcq and Wright, note 3 supra, at 472-73
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Others have read significance into the Judicial Code of 1948,
which eliminated a provision which had stood for 159 years, that
there should be no reversal in the appellate court "for any error
in fact." 2 9 But it is hard to believe that the elimination of these
words was intended to alter the scope of review of damages. Indeed the Reviser's Notes say that the language has been changed
to avoid any construction that matters of fact are not reviewable in nonjury casesY°
It is hard to build on this foundation an argument that the altered
language changes the scope of review in jury cases, particularly in
view of the language of the Seventh Amendment.
But if the stated reasons for change in scope of review seem,
on examination, unsubstantial, it is not difficult to guess what may
have been the real reason for this change. Verdicts have gotten
much larger. As one court lamented, shortly before discovering that
it had power to deal with excessive verdicts
The way the amounts awarded in verdicts in personal injury
cases have been rapidly increasing is a matter of concern to all
who are interested in a fair and orderly administration of justice. If the amounts awarded in the next decade keep pace with
the rate at which they increased in the last decade, in certain
areas at least, verdicts of $150,000, $200,000, $250,00 or even
greater sums may be expected. Even allowing for the decreased
purchasing power of the dollar, many of the recent large
awards for damages are not justified. 31
It matters not a bit for our present purposes whether the court
is right or wrong m its supposition that many recent verdicts are
not justified. The important fact is that, rightly or wrongly, many
appellate courts think they see in the present size of verdicts a
threat to the fair and orderly administration of justice. And when
they see what they consider to be an evil, they, as appellate judges
have done from time out of mind, take steps to correct that evil.
That the size of the verdict has long been considered an issue
of fact, to be resolved by the jury and subject to the approval of the
trial court, is of little moment. In less time than it takes to tell
29. These words appeared m § 22 of the Judicial Code of 1789. 1 Stat.
85 (1789), and were carred forward into § 879 of the 1940 Code. They are

replaced by §§ 2105 and 2106 of the present Code. See 6 Moore, Federal

Practice 3826 (2d ed. 1953), Holmes, J., dissenting in Sunray Oil Corp. v.
Allbritton, 188 F2d 751, 756 (5th Cir. 1951).
30. Title 28, United States Code Judiciary and Judicial Procedure With

Official Legislative History and Reviser's Notes 1900 (West 1948).

31. Wetherbee v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 191 F.2d 302, 309 (7th Cir. 1951),
cert. dented, 346 U.S. 867 (1953).
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about it, this issue has been transformed into the trial court's clear
abuse of discretion in refusing to order a new trial, this, in turn, is
said to be an issue of law, and the size of verdicts has become a
matter for appellate courts, rather than trial courts and juries, to
decide.
SETTING ASIDE VERDICTS AS AGAINST WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE

In the recent case of Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 2
Eastern claimed it was entitled to a new trial on the ground, among
others, that verdicts against it arising out of the disastrous 1949
crash over Washington's National Airport between an Eastern
DC-4 and a P-38 owned by the Bolivian government were "against
the clear weight of the evidence." After a review of the authorities
(which will be analyzed later) the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, speaking through Judge Wilbur K. Miller, said
We conclude, on the authorities and on reason as well, that the
trial judge had the power and duty to grant a new trial if the
verdicts were against the clear weight of the evidence, or if for
any reason or combination of reasons justice would miscarry
if they were allowed to stand, and that this court has the power
and duty to reverse and order a new trial if the trial judge
abused his discretion in denying the inotwn therefor "
Judge Miller argued in detail his reasons for believing that the
trial judge had abused his discretion in denying the motion for a
new trial. But Judges Edgerton and Fahy, though agreeing that
they had power to reverse if there had been an abuse of discretion,
did not find such an abuse on the record before them. Thus the
verdicts were allowed to stand.
The result of the case is of no significance for our purpose. But
the claim of power to reverse and order a new trial is sufficiently
novel to justify the closest scrutiny
As to the first half of the quoted passage from the opinion, there
can be no quarrel. The right of the trial judge to set aside the verdict as contrary to the clear weight of the evidence is universally
acknowledged in the United States, and is supported by clear
precedent at common law 34 And if the trial judge refuses to exercise his discretion at all on a motion for new trial, as where he
mistakenly believes he lacks power to set aside a verdict, an
32. 239 F.2d 25 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. demcd, 77 S.Ct. 816 (1957).

33. Id. at 30.
34. 6 Moore, Federal Practice § 59.08[5] (2d ed. 1953), Riddell, New
Trial at the Common Law, 26 Yale L.J. 49 (1916).
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appellate court will remand the case to hun with instructions to
3
exercise Ins discretion. 5
Thus the only questionable statement in the passage quoted is
the part which has been italicized, the claim that where the trial
court has exercised its discretion and has determined not to set
aside the verdict, the appellate court has power to reverse and
order a new trial. In the portion of its opinion immediately preceding the passage quoted here, the court of appeals cites or quotes
from eleven cases. 0 Many of these cases are completely silent
as to appellate power, and are concerned exclusively with the
power of the trial judge to set aside the verdict. In one case there
is a dictum that the appellate court can reverse for abuse of discreton by a trial court in passing on a motion for a new trial on the
ground that the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence."
Three of the cases cited contain dicta that the power to set aside
a verdict on this ground "belongs exclusively to the trial judge,"38
that ins action on such a motion "is not the subject of review, 3 0
and that the appellate court is "without power" to order a new trial
on this ground.4 0 Among the eleven cases cited by the court of
appeals, there is not even one in which an appellate court has reversed for abuse of discretion in denying such a motion for a new
trial. From this review it may fairly be said that the statement of
the court of appeals is not supported by the cases it chooses to cite.
There are other relevant authorities which the court of appeals
did not cite. Thus as long ago as 1838 the Supreme Court had
considered it
a point too well settled to be now drawn into question, that
the effect and sufficiency of the evidence, are for the consideration and determination of the jury; and the error is to be redressed, if at all, by application to the court below for a new
trial, -and
cannot be made a ground of objection on a writ
41
of error.

And as recently as 1940 it had stated categoricallyCertainly, denial of a motion for a new trial on the grounds
35. E.g., Snead v. New York Cent. R.R. 216 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1954)

Felton v. Spiro, 78 Fed. 576 (6th Cir. 1897) , Marsh v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 175

F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1949).

36. 239 F.2d at 29-30.

37

Virginian Ry. v. Armentrout, 166 F.2d 400, 408 (4th Cir. 1948).

38. Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 186 F.2d 926, 932-33 (9th Cir.), cert.
denmed, 341 U.S. 904 (1951).
39. Felton v. Spiro, 78 Fed. 576, 581 (6th Cir. 1897).
40. Snead v. New York Cent R., 216 F.2d 169, 172 (4th Cir. 1954).
41. United States v. Laub, 37 U.S. (12 Pet) 1, 4 (1838).
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that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence would
not be subject to review 42
A number of decisions from the courts of appeals are to the same
effect. In one of the most recent, Judge Learned Hand put the
matter this way
[Tihere may be errors that are not reviewable at all, and
among those that are not are erroneous orders granting or
denying motions to set aside verdicts on the ground that they
are against the weight of the evidence.
[This rule] is too
43
well established to justify discussion.
It is true that there are casual phrases in some court of appeals
decisions which imply a power to reverse for clear abuse of discretion. But it seems to me significant that, so far as I can find, there
is not a single case in which a federal appellate court has ever
reversed and ordered a new trial on the ground that the trial
44
court did abuse its discretion in denying a motion of this type.
I conclude that the authorities do not support the statement of the
court of appeals in the case here being considered that it has power
to reverse on this ground.
But the court of appeals grounded its statement "on reason
as well." The appeal to reason requires consideration of the Seventh
Amendment, and its application to this situation.
[N]o fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined
in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules
of the common law
One possible escape from the apparent barrier which the
amendment poses to appellate review of the weight of the evidence is that the appellate court, in considering whether the
42. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 248 (1940)
43. Portman v. American Home Products Corp., 201 F.2d 847, 848
(2d Cir. 1953).
44. Moore, who asserts in his text that there can be reversal for abuse
of discretion, cites a great many cases with casual phrases to this effect, but
cites only two cases as holdings supporting his text. 6 Moore, Federal Practice 3820 n.34 (2d ed. 1953), and id. 32 (1956 Cum. Supp.). In one of these
cases, Charles v. Norfolk & W Ry., 188 F.2d 691 (7th Cir.), cert. demed.
342 U.S. 831 (1951), there was also an erroneous instruction justifying reversal, and, more important, the trial judge had expressed his own disagreement with the verdict. Thus the case is similar to these cited in note 35 supra,
where the trial court mistakenly felt it lacked power to order a new trial.
In Indamer Corp. v. Crandon, 217 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1954), the court said
there could be reversal, not where the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence, but only where "there has been no evidence introduced which could
support the verdict on the point on which the new trial is sought." Id. at 394.
Thus it ordered a new trial in circumstances where judgment notwithstanding the verdict might have been justified.
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trial judge has abused his discretion, is passing on a question of
law rather than a question of fact.45 A similar argument is used,
as we have seen, to justify appellate control of the size of the
verdict. But the argument is so purely verbal, and its implications
for the Seventh Amendment so plainly devastating, that it has
not attracted much support. If a jury finds defendant negligent,
and the appellate court decides that the clear weight of the evidence
shows him free from negligence, it is re-examining the jury's determination of a fact issue. Very few people are deceived into thinking
the issue has been transmuted into an issue of law because the
appellate court says it is finding only that the trial judge abused
his discretion in not finding the clear weight of the evidence to be
contrary to the verdict.
Professor Blume, who supports appellate review of these
motions, admits that:
[I]t cannot be said that the question presented is a question
of law. In deciding whether a jury found against the weight
of evidence, the trial judge must weigh the evidence and decide
the facts. In reviewing his decision the appellate court is reviewing the case on the facts.4
Professor Blume goes on to argue that it is not the jury's determmation of facts which the appellate court is considering, but the
trial judge's findings of fact in refusing to set the verdict aside. But
the Supreme Court has rejected this argument:
[I]t is not the province of this Court or the circuit court
of appeals to review orders granting or denying motions for a
new trial when such review is sought on the alleged ground that
the trial court made erroneous findings of fact.
While the
appellate court might intervene when the findings of fact are
wholly unsupported by evidence
it should never do so
where it does not dearly4 7 appear that the findings are not supported by any evidence.
The most popular argument in support of appellate review in
these circumstances is that the Seventh Amendment prohibits reexamination of facts found by juries only when such re-examination is contrary to "the rules of the common law." Everyone con45.

See Virginian Ry. v. Armentrout 166 F2d 400, 408 (4th Cir. 1948).

46. Blume, Review of Facts in Jury Cases-The Seventh Amendmnent,

20 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 130, 131 (1936).

47. United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106, 111-12 (1946). The case cited
is a criminal case, but federal courts do not seem ever to have distinguished
between civil and crumnal cases in considering appellate power to order a
new trial. Indeed in the passage quoted the Court relies on a civil case, Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474 (1933).
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cedes that the weight of the evidence could not be raised by writ of
error and thus was not subject to appellate review at the time the
Seventh Amendment was adopted. But it was the practice at common law prior to that date for the trial to be conducted by a single
judge at nisi prius, and for motions for a new trial to be heard by
the court sitting en banc at W'estminster. It is argued that this
review by the court en banc is more like present American appellate
practice than it is like our motion for a new trial, addressed to the
single judge who presided at the trial. Thus it is contended that the
Seventh Amendment does not prevent modern appellate courts from
exercising those powers which might have been exercised by the
4
full court sitting at Westminster in 18th century England. 1
It is clear that English courts did grant new trials on the
ground that the verdict was contrary to the clear weight of the
evidence. And we can agree with the pronouncement of Lord
Mansfield in one such case
Trials by jury in civil causes could not
subsist now without
4
power somewhere to grant new trials.

9

But this does not settle the matter. In the first place, it oversimplifies the historical data. An exhaustive examination of the
early English cases has led one writer to conclude there is not
a single case where an English court at common law ever granted
a new trial, as being against the evidence, unless the judge or
judges who sat with the jury stated in open court, or certified, that
the verdict was against the evidence and that he was dissatisfied
with the verdict. 50 This important difference between early English
practice and the procedure which it is now claimed to justify for the
United States has been tossed off by one court as "not one of those
essential attributes of jury trial which the constitution preserves. '"'
But the matter is hardly that easy Assuming the accuracy of the
48. E.g., Corcoran v. City of Chicago, 373 Ill.
567, 27 N.E.2d 451
(1940), Blume, note 46 supra, at 131, Note, 30 Tex. L. Rev. 242 (1951)
The seventh amendment does not bind the state, and they are free, so far as the
United States Constitution goes, to permit appellate courts to set aside verdicts if they wish. But as the Corcoran case above indicates, many state constitutions lay down a test similar to the seventh amendment. State appellate
courts are not permitted to set a verdict aside as against the weight of the
evidence in suits under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Harsh v.
Illinois Term. R.R., 348 U.S. 940 (1955), reversing 351 Ill.
App. 272, 114
N.E.2d 901 (1953).
49. Bright v. Eynon, 1 Burr. 391, 393, 97 Eng. Rep. 365, 366 (K.B. 1757)
50. Welsbrod, Limitations on Trial by Jury in Illinois, 19 Chi-Kent L.
Rev. 91, 92 (1940). I do not find in the literature any disagreement with tls
conclusion, nor have I found any case contrary to the rule Weisbrod states.
51. Olson v. Chicago Transit Authority, 1 Ill.2d 83, 85, 115 N.E.2d 301,
303 (1953).
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historical conclusion, the common law system was one in which
the verdict could be set aside only if the judge who had presided
at the trial and heard the witnesses deemed the verdict to be unjustified, and even then, only if he could persuade his brothers
at Westminster to this view. Thus we have already liberalized the
granting of new trials beyond that known at common law, since
under the present American system, the trial judge can set aside
the verdict on this ground without getting the approval of any
other judge. To-allow appellate review of his action would mean
that the verdict could be set aside solely by judges who were not
present at the trial even though the trial judge, by denying the
motion for a new trial, has found that the verdict is not contrary
to the clear weight of the evidence. This would be a complete reversal of the common law practice, and can hardly be said to meet
the test of the Seventh Amendment.
But there is another argument not unworthy of consideration.
Regardless of what the facts may have been as to procedure in
England prior to the adoption of our bill of rights, it is abundantly
clear, as the authorities cited earlier show, that for at least 150
years federal courts thought that the Seventh Amendment prohibited appellate review of denial of a motion to set aside the
verdict as contrary to the weight of the evidence. It is true that
a long history of interpretation of a provision one way is not as
conclusive when it is the Constitution which is to be construed as
it would be if a mere statute were involved.5 2 But surely the unanimous views of the judges of the past are entitled to respect, and
should not be cast aside save on the clearest showing of "the unconstitutionality of the course pursued." 53
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has not
made a clear demonstration that it has the power to set aside
verdicts as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Its claim of
such power is not supported by the authorities it cites, nor by
the cases it does not cite. It does not attempt a reasoned analysis
of the problem, and we have seen that such an analysis would
leave its conclusion, at best, very doubtful. The court's statement
is, of course, merely a dictum, but as was shown in the section on
review of size of verdicts, today's dictum claiming extended power
for appellate courts is frequently the prelude to tomorrow's holding
to that effect.
52. Douglas, Stare Decusus, 49 Colui. L. Rev. 735 (1949).
53. See Ene R.R. v. Tompkans, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938).
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The Seventh Amendment applies only to facts found by a jury
It has no application to facts found by the court, in cases where
jury trial has been waived or where there is no right to a jury
The scope of review in this class of cases may be regulated by
legislation or by court rule.
Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the
similar rules in other modern pleading systems, say
Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous,
and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.
Such a rule has been thought to leave a question, of considerable
interest for our purposes, as to the scope of review of the trial
court's findings in cases where the evidence was documentary, and
where, therefore, the trial court had no special opportunity "to
judge of the credibility of the witnesses." Some courts have said
that in such a situation the appellate court, being in as good a
position to judge the evidence as was the trial court, can more
readily find the trial court's findings to be clearly erroneous."
Though such a gloss on Rule 52 (a) may be regarded as unnecessary,55 it has at least the merit of being a sound gloss. But then
other courts, reasoning from the gloss on Rule 52 rather than from
the rule itself, went on to say that the appellate court is not
bound at all, and that review is de novo with no presumption in
favor of the trial court's findings, where the evidence below was
not oral.56

This process was carried to its ultimate in a famous opinion
by Judge Jerome N. Frank in which he set out some seven narrowly-defined classes, turning on the kind of case and the proportion of testimony that was oral, and asserted that the freedom of
review is dependent upon the class in which a particular case
54. See the cases from seven circuits cited in Wright, Amendments to
the Federal Rules: The Function of a Continuing Riles Committee, 7 Vand.
L. Rev. 521, 534 n.33 (1954).
55. "This was perhaps not harmful, though to add an additional measure
of discretion to a rule calling for the exercise of discretion was, if not confusing, at least gilding the lily." Clark, Special Problens in Drafting and
Interpreting Procedural Codes and Rules, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 493, 505 (1950)
56. Dollar v. Land, 184 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dented, 340 U.S. 884
(1950) , Bertel v. Panama Transport Co., 202 F.2d 247, 249 (2d Cir. 1953),
Panama Transport Co. v. The Maravi, 165 F.2d 719, 720 (2d Cir. 1948),
Stokes v. United States, 144 F.2d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 1944) , Carter Oil Co. v.
McQuigg, 112 F.2d 275, 279 (7th Cir. 1940) , see General Cas. Co. v. School
District No. 5, 233 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1956).

OMNISCIENCE OF APPELLATE COURTS

1957]

falls.5 7 Judge Harrie B. Chase, dissenting, uttered a useful reminder in the course of explaining his unwillingness to reverse
the trial court:
Tls is a typical instance for the application of Civil Rule
52(a) Though trial judges may at times be mistaken as to
facts, appellate judges are not always omniscient."
Though it is probably true that Judge Frank's view is the more
popular among the federal courts of appeals, it has not won unanimous acceptance. There continues to be a substantial number of
cases in which the courts hold that the "clearly erroneous" test
applies to all nonjury cases, regardless of the nature of the
evidence. 59
Appraisal of these competing views as to the weight to be given
findings based on documentary evidence is made difficult because
of the inconclusiveness of the historical data. The Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 52 said, in part.
The rule stated in the third sentence of Subdivision (a) accords
with the decisions on the scope of the review in modern federal
equity practice. It is applicable to all classes of findings in cases
tried without a jury whether the finding is of a fact concerning
which there was, conflict of testimony, or of a fact deduced or
inferred from uncontradicted testimony.c
Unfortunately "modem federal equity practice" sheds very
little light on the scope of review in documentary evidence cases.
It is clear enough that ancient equity did permit a somewhat vague
de novo review, and that in ancient equity evidence was submitted
by depositions rather than by oral testimony." This broad review
has been abandoned in this country only in the last century, and it
would be idle to deny that one reason for its abandonment was
the substitution of oral testimony for depositions in the usual equity
57

Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537, 539-40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340

U.S. 810 (1950). The case is scathingly criticized in Comment, Scope of
Appellate Fact Retmew Widened, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 784 (1950).
58. Orvis v. Higgins, supra note 57, at 542.
59. "Some courts have held Rule 52 (a) not to apply where the findings

below were based upon stipulated or undisputed subsidiary facts. We have not
In our opinion Rule 52 (a) unambiguously governs all findings, and its
additional caveat, that due regard is to be given to the trial court's opportunity
to judge credibility, is merely cautionary advice, not a variation In the scope
of review." Texas Co. v. R. O'Brien & Co., Inc., 242 F.2d 526, 529 (1st Cir.
1957). Accord Bishop v. United States, 223 F.2d 582, 586-87 (D.C. Cir.
1955), Galena Oaks Corp. v. Scofield, 218 F.2d 217, 219 (5th Cir. 1954), Hill
v. Gregory, 241 F2d 612 (7th Cir. 1957), Holt v. WVerbe, 198 F2d 910 (8th

Cir. 1952), see Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480, 491 (2d Cir.
1946).
60. 5 Moore, Federal Practice § 52.01[4] (2d ed. 1951).
61. Pound, Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases 300-1 (1941).
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case. 62 But this is not the only factor involved. As Dean Pound
points out, an attempt to analogize the scope of review in equity
cases with that prevailing in legal actions, the pressure of work
in appellate courts, and a feeling that the primary function of
appellate courts is to find and declare the law, all played a part."
Thus, while isolated cases can be found prior to 1937 in which it
was said that the old de novo review continued to apply where
the evidence was not oral, it is far from clear that these represented
any considered or consistent view It is of some significance that
the major treatises on equity and on federal practice prior to
adoption of the Federal Rules are either ambiguous

4

or silent

as to the scope of review of findings based on documentary
evidence.
The matter is made more complicated because of the union of
law and equity which was proceeding in many states during the
same years that chancery review was in transition. The experience
of these code states was so diverse that it offers little guidance for
our problem. Some of the code states adopted for all cases the very
limited review theretofore available in actions at law, while other
states purported to permit review as in equity of findings in nonjury cases.65 Just what was meant by the latter must be left to the
imagination. In Missouri, for example, it meant that, even where
the testimony was oral, the findings of the trial court would be
accepted only "when there is conflict of testimony, or where the
testimony is evenly balanced and the finding of the chancellor
appears to be correct."6 16 And in Nebraska, in a thorough and
thoughtful opinion, it was concluded that where the evidence is
entirely documentary, the appellate court is to be governed by its
own conclusion as to the weight of the evidence, and the rule that
findings are to be set aside only if clearly erroneous "has no application."6 7 Yet in Minnesota it has been settled from the earliest
days that the trial court's findings must be accepted unless clearly
erroneous, even though they are based exclusively on documentary
evidence."'
62. See, e.g., American Rotary Valve Co. v. Moorehead, 266 Fed. 202,
203 (7th Cir. 1915) , Dickinson v. Todd, 172 Mass. 183, 51 N.E. 976 (1898)
63. Pound, op. ct. supra note 61, at 300-1.
64. E.g., Marker, Federal Appellate Jurisdiction and Procedure § 225
(1935)
65. Clark and Stone, Review of Findings of Fact, 4 U. Chi. L. Rev. 190,
215 (1937).
66. Benne v. Schnecko, 100 Mo. 250, 258, 13 S.W 82, 84 (1890)
67 Faulkner v. Sims, 68 Neb. 295, 306, 94 N.W 113, 116 (1903).
68. Humphrey v. Havens, 12 Minn. 298 (1867), Sommers v. City of St.
Paul, 183 Minn. 545, 551, 237 N.W 427, 430 (1931), Wright, Minnesota
Rules 63 (1956 Supp.).
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The California experience is instructive. In Rcay v. Butler,"
an appellant argued that the reviewing court should find the facts
for itself, since most of the evidence was documentary. He pointed
to cases saying that the reason for giving deference to the findings
below is that the trial court has seen the witnesses, and argued
that since this reason was inapplicable in his case, the usual rule
should not apply. The court rejected this contention
It has been held here in more than a hundred cases
that the
finding of a jury or a court as to a fact decided upon the weight
of evidence will not be reviewed by this court, and so the general rule is dearly established. It was said, however, in the
opimon of the court in two or three cases
that the reason of
the rule is that the court below has the advantage of observing
the appearance and bearing of the witnesses, and that such
reason does not obtain when the witnesses do not appear personally in court. But it may be well argued that such is not
the only reason of the rule, that it is founded in the essential
distinction between the trial and the appellate court under our
system, and grows out of considerations of jurisdiction, that it
is the province of the trial court to decide questions of fact, of
the appellate court to decide questions of law; that this court
can rightfully set aside a finding for want of evidence only
where there is no evidence to support it, or where the supporting evidence is so slight as to show abuse of discretion.
The
appellate court will, no doubt, look a little more closely into the
evidence when it consists entirely of depositions, or affidavits,
or notes of former testimony; but it cannot be taken as settled
that in70 such a case the rule as to conflicting evidence does not
apply.
In 1926 the California Constitution was amended to provide
that appellate courts "may make findings of fact contrary to, or
in addition to, those made by the trial court."' A distinguished
proponent of broad appellate review read this as meaning that the
appellate courts were now "to permit a review of the facts in cases
tried without a jury."7 2 But the appellate courts held otherwise.
They construed the amendment as not
intended to abrogate the general rule respecting the powers
of the trial court in its determination of questions of fact or the
rule that the reviewing court is bound by the findings of the
trial court if based upon substantial evidence.
In other
69. 95 Cal. 206, 30 Pac. 208 (1892).

70. Id. at 214-15, 30 Pac. at 209.
71. Cal. Const., art VI, § 4Y. The constitutional provision is implemented by statute. Cal. Code Civil Proc. § 956a (West 1955).

72. Sunderland, The Scope of Judicial Review, 27 Mich. L. Rev. 416,
434 (1929).
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words, it was not the purpose generally to so confuse the functions of the respective courts as to make the findings of the
trial courts, when based on substantial evidence, merely recommendations as, for example, the finding of a referee or commissioner.73
In 1903 Roscoe Pound, speaking as Commissioner for the
Nebraska Supreme Court, said
The reported decisions of this court leave the question as
to the power and duty of the court on appeal from findings of
fact in some seeming confusion.
[A]s a consequence of this
confusion, some support may be found for taking any course,
with respect to findings
of fact challenged on appeal, which the
74
court may choose.
What Pound found to be true of a single jurisdiction was the more
true for American jurisdictions taken collectively All that can
be said with assurance is that there was no generally accepted
doctrine as to the scope of review of findings of fact where the
testimony was not oral.
Since scope of review in nonjury cases poses no constitutional
questions and is subject to alteration by statute or court rule,
perhaps history, and particularly, confusing history, can be put
to one side, and resort had instead to the language and intent of
Federal Rule 52(a) Professor Moore, who favors broad review
in the situation we are discussing, concedes that the intent of Judge
Charles E. Clark, the draftsman of Rule 52, was to have the
"clearly erroneous" test apply regardless of the nature of the
evidence, but he believes that the rule as written supports broader
review of findings based on nondemeanor testimony, and that "for
litigants the pudding is the payoff, not the cook's intent." 75 One
naturally hesitates to disagree with an authority so respected as
Professor Moore, but, with deference, I suggest that the history
and language of the rule are clearly consistent with Judge Clark's
understanding of it.
In the Preliminary Draft of May, 1936, of the Federal Rules,
findings were covered by Rule 68. In that draft it was provided
that
The findings of the court in such cases shall have the same
effect as that heretofore given to findings in suits in equity
This caused some professional controversy Judge Clark revealed
publicly that in this instance he did not agree with the action of
73. Tupman v. Haberkern, 208 Cal. 256, 265-66, 280 Pac. 970, 974 (1929)
74. Faulkner v. Sims, 68 Neb. 295, 300-1, 94 N.W 113, 114 (1903)
75. 5 Moore, Federal Practice 2642 (2d ed. 1951)
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the Advisory Committee, and argued that the very limited review
available therefore in law actions should be made the test in all
cases.76 Judge W Calvin Chesnut supported this view,- while
Professor W Wirt Blume defended the Advisory Committee's preference for the broader equity review.78 But all this debate ran to the
choice between no reversal of findings of fact, as at law, and reversal where dearly erroneous, as in equity. No one urged that
there should be an even broader, de novo review where the evidence was documentary."0
The Advisory Committee never explained why it altered the
language of the findings rule before finally recommending it to the
Supreme Court for adoption as Rule 52. One article even surmised
that perhaps judge Clark had won, and that the law standard of
review was being adopted after all."0 This suggestion was quite
apparently erroneous, in view of the statement in the Committee
Note that the test "accords with the decisions on the scope of the
review in modern federal equity practice." In two respects the
form of the rule as finally adopted seems to prohibit any distinchon between findings based on oral evidence and findings based
on documents. First, the rule as finally adopted states positively the
test to be applied, rather than adopting by reference prior standards of review in equity. Thus even if the historical evidence that
distinctions of the sort we are considering had been made in equity
were far stronger than it appears to be, these distinctions would
nevertheless be improper if contrary to what the rule itself says.
Second, Rule 52 says that findings shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous and due regard shall be given to the opportunity
of the trial court to-judge of the credibility of the witnesses. If
the word "and" means anything, it must mean that these are two
separate restrictions being placed on appellate review of findings.
judge Frank and Professor Moore read the rule as if it said
'Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous if
76. Clark, Re-,ew of Facts under Proposed Federal Rules, 20 J. Am.
Jud. Soc'y 129 (1936), Clark and Stone, Reaew of Findings of Fact, 4 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 190 (1937).
77 Chesnut, Analysis of Proposed New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 22 A.B.A.J. 533, 540-41 (1936).
78. Blume, Review of Facts ti Non-Jury Cases,20 J. Ain. Jud. Soc'y 68

(1936).
79. Indeed the only mention of the point is a statement by Judge Clark
and Professor Stone, relying on secondary authorities, that reviewing courts
in equity did distinguish between findings based on oral testimony given in
open court and those based on written documents and depositions. Clark and
Stone, Review of Findings of Fact, 4 1. Chi. L. Rev. 190, 208 (1937).
80. Ilsen and Hone, FederalAppellate Practiceas Affected by the New
Rules of Civil Procedure,24 Alinn. L. Rev. 1, 32-35 (1939).
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the trial court has had an opportunity to judge of the credibility
of the witnesses."
That Rule 52 required application of the "clearly erroneous"
test to all findings, regardless of the nature of the evidence, should
thus have been apparent to anyone who understands the difference
between a hypothetical and a conjunctive proposition. And this
conclusion should have been reinforced by the Advisory Committee
Note which said that the "clearly erroneous" test was to apply even
where the finding was "deduced or inferred from uncontradicted
testimony," a situation which is functionally the same as a finding
based on nondemeanor evidence.8 '
It must, therefore, be reluctantly concluded that those appellate
courts which have substituted their judgment for that of the trial
court as to findings based on other than oral testimony have acted
contrary to both the plain meaning and the stated intent of the governing rule. A cynic might say this is a tempest about mere words.
After all, the "clearly erroneous" test "is not a measure of exact
and uniform weight. 8 2- The courts which have disregarded Rule 52
in substituting their judgment for that of the trial court could
accomplish the same purpose while complying with the rule merely
by announcing that the finding with which they disagree is "clearly
erroneous." But I think we can safely assume that appellate judges
do make a conscientious attempt to confine their review to that
authorized by law, and that, so far as human frailties permit, they
do not regard a finding as clearly erroneous merely because it
differs from the finding they might themselves have made.
This issue about findings has seemed to me worth exploring
at such length because in final analysis it presents a jurisprudential
question of central importance to this entire paper. Even if we concede that in the situation we have been considering the appellate
court is in just as good a position as the trial court to determine
81. This analysis of the intent of the original rule is fully supported
by the recent proposal of the Advisory Committee to amend Rule 52(a) in

such manner as to ensure that that intent will be followed, and by the Committee Note to the proposed amendment. Advisory Committee on Rules for

Civil Procedure, Report of Proposed Amendments 51-54 (Oct. 1955). The
Supreme Court has not yet acted on the proposed amendments. For Professot
Moore's criticism of the amendment to Rule 52(a) see Moore, Federal Rules

247 (1956).
82. Galena Oaks Corp. v. Scofield, 218 F.2d 217, 219 (5th Cir. 1954)

See also Learned Hand, in United States v. Alumiium Co. of America, 148
F.2d 416, 433 (2d Cir. 1945) "It is idle to try to define the meaning of the
phrase 'clearly erroneous', all that can be profitably said is that an appellate
court, though it will hesitate less to reverse the findings of a judge than that
of an administrative tribunal or of a jury, will nevertheless reverse it most
reluctantly and only when well persuaded. This is true to a considerable
degree even when the judge has not seen the witnesses."
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what the fact is, does it follow that the view of the appellate court
must therefore prevail over that of the trial court? To Professor
Moore it does. This is "a natural and proper concomitant of
appellate power. '8 3 But others take a different view, eloquently
expressed by the Eighth Circuit:
The entire responsibility for deciding doubtful fact questions in
a nonjury case should be, and we think it is, that of the district
court. The existence of any doubt as to whether the trial court
or this Court is the ultimate trier of fact issues in nonjury cases
is, we think, detrimental to the orderly administration of justice, inpairs the confidence of litigants and the public in the
decisions of the district courts, and multiplies the number of
appeals in such cases."'
I leave for the Conclusion an expression of my own view on this
issue.
USE OF THE EXTRAORDINARY

WTRITS TO CONTROL

DISCRETIONARY AcTION

In the spring of 1955 the Honorable Walter J. LaBuy, a judge
of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, was confronted with a problem. High on his calendar
were two large and complex antitrust cases, which had been pending for five years.8 5 In one case eighty-seven operators of retail
independent shoe repair shops were suing six manufacturers,
wholesalers, retail mail order houses and chain operators, alleging
a conspiracy to monopolize and fix the price of shoe repair supplies
sold in the Chicago area in violation of the Sherman Act, and
also alleging price discrimination in violation of the RobinsonPatman Act. The other case involved similar claims by six wholesalers of shoe repair supplies against six defendants. These cases
had already occupied much of Judge LaBuy's time. In the first
case alone the original complaint had been twice amended, fourteen
defendants had been dismissed with prejudice, a motion for summary judgment had been heard and denied, over fifty depositions
had been taken, and numerous hearings had been held in connection
with discovery matters. Judge LaBuy commented that the case had
taken a long time to get to issue and that he had heard more
motions in connection with it than in any case he had ever sat on.
83. 5 Moore, Federal Practice 2642 (2d ed. 1951).
84. Pendergrass v. New York Life Ins. Co., 181 F2d 136, 138 (8th

Cir. 1950).
85. The facts as to the cases before Judge LaBuy, and his action thereon,

are taken from LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352-U.S. 249, 251-53 (1957).
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When the first of these cases appeared on Judge LaBuy's
calendar as ready for trial, the lawyers estimated it would take six
weeks to try The judge indicated that he did not know how he
could try a case which would take so long, particularly since all
parties were anxious for an early trial. When the parties refused to
consent to referring the case to a master for trial, Judge LaBuy,
on his own motion, ordered the case to a master.
Federal Rule 53(b) provides, in part
A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule.
a reference shall
[I]n actions to be tried without a jury
be made only upon a showing that some exceptional condition
requires it.

Judge LaBuy believed that such an exceptional condition was presented because the cases were very complicated and complex, they
would take a considerable time to try, and his calendar was congested.
It can well be agreed that reference to a master contains many
possibilities of evil, and that this device should be sparingly used. 80
The rule indicates as much on its face. And it is no part of our concern to evaluate Judge LaBuy's decision that conditions in the
cases before him were so "exceptional" as to justify a reference.
What is of interest to us is that the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit felt that it could and should substitute its judgment that exceptional conditions did not exist for Judge LaBuy's
decision that they did, and that it could use the ancient writ of
mandamus to compel him to vacate his order referring the cases
to a master. 87 And even more important, the United States Supreme Court, by a vote of five to four, upheld this action of the
court of appeals. 88
The significant feature of the case is not that the upper courts
disagreed with Judge LaBuy, but that they held they could consider his order at all. The historic federal policy has been that only
final judgments can be reviewed, save for a few narrow statutory
exceptions. 89 It is true that the concept of finality is not always easy
to apply, but on no interpretation could Judge LaBuy's order be
regarded as a final judgment. It was a purely interlocutory order,
86. See Adventures in Good Eating v. Best Places to Eat, 131 F.2d
809, 815 (7th Cir. 1942) , Vanderbilt, Cases and Materials on Modern Procedure and Judicial Administration 1240-41 (1952)
87 Howes Leather Co. v. LaBuy, 226 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1955)
88. LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
89. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292. See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S.
323, 324 (1940) , Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 Yale
L.J. 539 (1932).
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regulating the procedure to be followed in a particular case, of a
sort that every trial judge makes many times in the course of every
case.
There have been times when the extraordinary writs of mandamus and prohibition have been used to review interlocutory
orders, but, as the Supreme Court said in 1947
We are unwilling to utilize them as substitutes for appeals. As
extraordinary remedies, they are reserved for really extraordinary causes. 0
Again in 1956 the Court summarized the usual federal doctrine.
Such writs may go only in aid of appellate jurisdiction. 28
U.S.C. § 1651. The power to issue them is discretionary and
it is sparingly exercised. Rule 30 of the Revised Rules of this
Court and the cases cited therein. This is not a case where a
court has exceeded or refused to exercise its jurisdiction, see
Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26, nor one
where appellate review will be defeated if a writ does not issue,
cf. Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 29-30. Here the most that
could be claimed is that the district courts have erred in ruling
on matters within their jurisdiction. The extraordinary writs
do not reach to such cases, they may not be used to thwart
the congressional policy against piecemeal appeals."
Tested by those principles the attempt to secure review, by writ
of mandamus, of Judge LaBuy's order must have seemed doomed
to defeat, for, just as in the case last quoted, apparently the most
that could be claimed was that he had erred in ruling on a matter
within his jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit analyzed the matter
differently. To that courtobviously the trial court here was not "acting within its
jurisdiction as a federal court to decide issues properly brought
before it," for here the court was not deciding issues presented
but was, over the objection
of both parties to the suit, refusing
92
to be bound by the rule.
What was "obvious" to a majority of the Seventh Circuit seemed
doubtful to others. The rule authorizes a judge to refer a case to a
master if he finds some "exceptional condition" which requires
this course. judge LaBuy, expressly grounding his action on the
rule, made a finding that there was such an "exceptional condition." Perhaps he was wrong in believing that the circumstances
before him were an "exceptional condition" within the meaning
90. Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260 (1947).

91. Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 520 (1956).

92. Howes Leather Co. v. LaBuy, 226 F.2d 703, 710 (7th Cir. 1955).
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of the rule, but surely for a judge to apply a rule mistakenly is
not the same thing as "refusing to be bound by the rule."3 Judge
Major, dissenting, stated the matter succinctly
No criteria are supplied either by statute or rule for determining the "exceptional condition" referred to in Rule 53(b)
Therefore, Judges might well disagree as to the circumstances
which would justify a reference. Respondent in the exercise of
his judgment concluded that the circumstances were sufficient
and ruled accordingly A judge with authority to make a
correct 4ruling has the same authority to make an erroneous
rulingY
Nor was the Seventh Circuit on any sounder ground in finding
the irreparable injury which, on the precedents, justifies use of
the extraordinary writs. It referred to "the necessity and great
expense of protracted trials which conceivably may eventually lead
nowhere but to a complete retrial of the causes before a competent tribunal." 95 But Supreme Court decisions had been explicit
that the inconvenience and expense of a useless trial "is one which
we must take it Congress contemplated in providing that only
final judgments should be reviewable." O
The opinion of the Supreme Court, affirming the Seventh Circuit,
is unenlightening. The Court discusses at some length the evils of
reference to masters and the advantages in having Judge LaBuy
try the cases himself. All of this discussion might well have been
appropriate on review of a final judgment in the case. But the Court
never specifies what "exceptional circumstances here warrant the
use of the extraordinary remedy of mandamus" 1 to correct Judge
LaBuy's error. The Court cautions that its holding in the case before
it is not intended "to authorize the indiscriminate use of prerogative
writs as a means of reviewing interlocutory orders."' 8 Unfortunately
it draws no line to distinguish proper use from "indiscriminate use."
And its conclusion that "supervisory control of the District Courts
93. Thus instances where the judges of a district have agreed to refer
all patent cases, or all admiralty cases, to a master, without regard to the

circumstances of the particular case, are clearly distinguishable. Mandamus

has been issued, quite properly, in such cases. Los Angeles Brush Mfg. Corp.

v. James, 272 U.S. 701 (1927), United States v. Kirkpatrick, 186 F.2d 393
(3d Cir. 1951) , cf. McCullough v. Cosgrave, 309 U.S. 634 (1940).
94. Howes Leather Co. v. LaBuy, 226 F.2d 703, 712 (7th Cir. 1955).
95. Id. at 705.

96. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 30 (1943), United

States Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 202-03 (1945).

97 LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 256 (1957)
98. Id. at 255. Thus the Sixth Circuit has been able to read the LaBuv

decision as making no great change in the law. Massey-Harris-Ferguson, Ltd.

v. Boyd, 242 F.2d 800 (6th Cir. 1957).
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by the Courts of Appeals is necessary to proper judicial administration in the federal system"0' 9 is not likely to be read as a caution of
restraint by appellate judges who believe that one of their trial
judges has erred in some interlocutory order.
The potential consequences of the LaBuy decision are truly
breathtaking. The central feature of modem procedural reform is
that trial courts are given discretion to decide details of procedure
which in the past have been governed by rigid statutes.100 Thus
joinder of claims and parties is now virtually unlimited while power is given the trial judge to order separate trials as to particular
claims or parties where this seems necessary. 10" The relevant rule
provides that the court may order such a separate trial "in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice."' 102 Are orders tnder this
rule now reviewable by mandamus? It is hard to see how the trial
court's findings as to "convenience" and "prejudice" under this rule
differ from his findings as to the existence of an "exceptional condition" justifying reference to a master under Rule 53(b). Will a
judge who finds that there is a genuine issue as to some material
fact, and thus denies a motion for summary judgment, be told, by
an appellate court that disagrees with him, that he was "refusing to
be bound by the rule" and that mandamus must issue to correct his
determination?
These may be imaginary horribles. But the danger to the discovery process is very real. Such concepts as "good cause therefor"1 0
and "any other order which justice requires to protect the party or
witness from annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression" 10 are fully
as subjective as the standard of "exceptional condition" involved in
99. 352 US. at 259-60.
100. Rives, A Court of Appeals Judge on the Federal Rules, 17 Ala.
Lawyer 324, 327-29 (1956). It is strange that modem procedural reform has
been centered almost exclusively on the trial courts, and that so little attention has been given to the role of the appellate courts. In a valuable and
penetrating recent article, justice Traynor, of the California Supreme Court
notes: "If we are in earnest that the law should keep pace with the times,
we must scrutinize appellate review as critically as trial procedure and the
practice of law.
[D]o we rationalize that the dignity of the appellate courts

depends on their mystery? If so, we do not honor them, for the implication
hovers in such a premise that whatever dignity attends the judicial process
emanates not from its exacting demands on mind and integrity, but from its
secrecy. We may even do them injury, for in modern times that which operates
in an aura of mystery may eventually find itself suspect rather than respected." Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of Slate Appellale
Courts, 24 U. Ci. L. Rev. 211-12 (1957).
101. Wright, Joinder of Clains and Parties tnder Modern Pleading
Rules, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 580 (1952).
102. Fed. R. Civ. P 42(b).
103. Fed. R. Civ. P 34.
104. Fed. R Civ. P 30(b).
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the LaBity case. Already state courts are using the extraordinary
writs to correct discovery orders with which they disagree.'Y0 It is
terrifying to think of the consequences, to the discovery process, to
the appellate courts, and to the cause of efficient judicial administration, if litigation is to be suspended by an application for writ of
mandamus every time one side or the other believes that the trial
judge has made a mistake in applying the discovery rules.
The "problems following in the wake of generally encouraged
repetitive invocations of mandamus"" 6° are well illustrated by the
controversy which now rages as to use of mandamus to review trial

court orders granting or denying a transfer to a more convenient
forum, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1404(a) 107 The views of the circults are utterly conflicting, ranging from the Seventh Circuit, which
grants mandamus to order the trial court to transfer a case for no
better reason than that it disagrees with him as to which forum is
the more convenient, 08 all the way to the Eighth Circuit, which has
announced flatly that "controversies about venue should be finally
settled and determined at the District Court level," and that it will
not even consider applications for mandamus to review transfer
orders. 09
Dean Green has observed of forum non conveniens, and its statutory counterpart in the federal system, that "as a delaying tactic it
"110 That this is true is largely because there
has few equals
105. E.g., Jeppesen v. Swanson, 243 Minn. 547, 68 N.W.2d 649 (1955),
State ex rel. Thompson v. Harris, 355 Mo. 176, 195 S.W.2d 645 (1946),
cf. Ex parte Pollard, 233 Ala. 335, 171 So. 628 (1936) , see Brown v. St. Paul
City Ry., 241 Minn. 15, 31-32, 62 N.W.2d 688, 698-99 (1954), Louisell,
Discovery and Pre-Trial Under the Minnesota Rules, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 633,
654-60 (1952). So far the federal cases have been very clear that the extraordinary writs cannot be used to review discovery orders. 4 Moore, Federal
Practice § 26.37[4] (2d ed. 1950).
106. Chicago, R.I. & P R.R. v. Igoe, 220 F.2d 299, 305 (7th Cir. 1955)
(dissenting opinion).
107 Kaufman, Further Observations on Transfers under Section
1404(a), 56 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 2-11 (1956), Comment, Review of Section
1404(a) Federal Venue Proceedings by ExtraordinaryWrit, 43 Calif. L. Rev.

841 (1955)

108. Chicago, R.I. & P R.R. v. Igoe, 220 F.2d 299 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 822 (1955). Indeed the Seventh Circuit really stacks the cards
against the trial judge, since it says "he is limited in his consideration to the
three factors specifically mentioned in § 1404(a), and he may not properly
be governed in his decision by any other factor or consideration." Id. at 302.
Then it goes on to list eight factors which persuaded it transfer should have
been granted in the particular case, only one of which is mentioned in the
statute. Id. at 304.
109. Great Northern Ry. v. Hyde, 238 F.2d 852, 857 (8th Cir. 1956) The
Eight Circuit has subsequently granted rehearing, 241 F.2d 707 (8th Cir.
1957), to reconsider its decision in the light of the LaBuy case.
110. Green, Jury Trial and Mr Justce Black, 65 Yale L.J. 482, 494
n.36 (1956).
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are some federal courts of appeals and some state courts"' that continue to entertain petitions for writs of mandamus to review the
application by the trial court of a doctrine that is expressly discretionary. The argument against appellate review of these orders has
been best stated by Judge Herbert Goodrich.
We think that this practice will defeat the object of the statute.
Instead of making the business of the courts easier, quicker and
less expensive, we now have the merits of the litigation postponed while appellate courts review the question where a case
may be tried.
Every litigant against whom the transfer issue is decided naturally thinks the judge was wrong. It is likely that in some cases
an appellate court would think so, too. But the risk of a party
being injured either by the granting or refusal of a transfer order
is, we think, much less than the certainty of harm through delay
and additional expense if these orders are to be subjected to
interlocutory review by mandamus
[W]e cannot escape the conclusion that it will be ughly unfortunate if the result of an attempted procedural improvement
is to subject parties to two lawsuits first, prolonged litigation to
determine the place where a case is to be tried, and, second, the
merits of the alleged cause of action itself.112
What judge Goodrich says with regard to 1404(a) orders is
largely true of all use of mandamus to review discretionary trial
court action. There is much ferment in the profession at the present
time to do away with the final judgment rule as a condition to appellate review. 13 Some jurisdictions have provided for interlocutory
appeals under carefully circumscribed circumstances,"'4 and similar
proposals are being advanced for the federal courts and elsewhere." 5
My -own view, elaborated in the Conclusion, is that any compromise
of the historic policy against piecemeal appeals would be a mistake.
But if there is to be any increase in review of interlocutory appeals
it seems very clear that it should come about by way of legislation
or court rule, rather than by more liberal use of extraordinary
111. E.g., Atchison, T. & S.F Ry. v. District Court, 298 P.2d 427
(Okla.), cert. dented, 352 U.S. 879 (1956).
112. All States Freight, Inc. v. Modarelli, 196 F.2d 1010, 1011-12 (3d
Cir. 1952).
113. 6 Moore, Feder'l Practice § 54.43[4] (2d ed. 1953), Note, Proposals for Interlocutory Appeals, 58 Yale L.J. 1186 (1949), Crick, The Final
Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 Yale L.J. 539, 558-64 (1932).
114. E.g., Utah R. Civ. P 72(b), N.J.R.R. 2.2-3, see Appeal of Pennsylvama R.R., 20 N.J. 398, 120 A2d 94 (1956).
115. See the proposed amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1292 endorsed by the
Judicial Conference of the United States. Report, Regular Annual 'Meeting of
Judicial Conference of the United States 27 (1953).
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writs.' A statute or a court rule can set out tight conditions for
use of this new kind of appeal. And a statute or a court rule can
speak explicitly, in a manner which will be clear to the bar. The
cause of proper judicial administration is not well served by expanding reviewability of interlocutory orders through a device so unclear
and so unconfined as judicial liberalization of the ancient writs of
mandamus and prohibition.
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

It is easier to summarize what we have seen than it is to evaluate
it. The four specific examples considered in this paper should be
enough to persuade anyone that appellate power is rapidly on the
increase. The appraisal by trial judge and jury of the damages suffered by an injured person is now subject to review by appellate
courts, a decade ago it could not have been reviewed. The determination by the trial judge that the verdict is not contrary to the clear
weight of the evidence is now said, by at least one appellate court, to
be within its power to reverse, heretofore the precedents have been
uniform that such a determination was not subject to reversal. Many
appellate courts now believe that they need not give any weight to
findings of fact of a trial judge sitting without a jury where these
findings are based on documentary evidence, both the language and
intent of Federal Rule 52(a), adopted by the Supreme Court only
19 years ago, are explicit that such findings can only be set aside
when clearly erroneous. Finally discretionary decisions by the trial
judge on interlocutory procedural matters may now be vacated in
the exercise of a supervisory power of appellate courts, contrary to
what the Supreme Court said as recently as 1956. Thus the centralization of legal power in the appellate courts, which Dean Green
detected more than a quarter century ago, proceeds at an accelerating pace.
But now we must venture some views as to whether this development is good or bad for the cause of justice to which all are devoted. It would be irresponsible even to suggest that these changes
have taken place merely because appellate courts are power-mad.
The obvious truth, which must be readily admitted by anyone familiar with appellate judges, is that these recent developments in the
law, these departures from what had seemed fairly clear lines of
precedent, have come only because the judges who have voted for
116. For a contrary view, see Note, The Writ of Mandamus: A Possible
Answer to the Final Judgment Rule, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 1102 (1950).
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them sincerely believe that they are needed and justified by the highest public interests.
This leads us to the philosophical question which underlies all
these specific issues- what is the proper function of an appellate
court? Everyone agrees, so far as I know, that one function of an
appellate court is to discover and declare - or to make - the law.
From the earliest times appellate courts have been empowered to
reverse for errors of law, to announce the rules which are to be
applied, and to ensure uniformity in the rules applied by various
inferior tribunals.
The controversial question is whether appellate courts have a
second function, that of ensuring that justice is done in a particular
case. In each of the situations considered the motivating force in the
appellate court's mind has been the desire to "do justice." Thus the
appellate court is unwilling to let an award of damages stand which
seems to it so excessive as to be unjust, it refuses to put its approval
on a verdict which it deems contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, it will not affirm a judgment based on findings it thinks wrong
when it is as well able to interpret documentary evidence and make
the finding in question as was the trial court, and it will not let a
trial judge's mistaken conception of what is an "exceptional conditon" result in exposing parties to the delay and expense of reference
to a master.
If it is the function of appellate courts to do justice in individual
cases, then each of the developments we have canvassed was sound
and desirable, since each has made it easier for the appellate court
to enforce its concept of justice in a particular case. The notion that
appellate courts should undertake to "do justice" is so attractive on
its face that it is difficult to disagree with it. And it enjoys the
weighty support of such famous students of the judicial process as
Roscoe Pound, Edson Sunderland, Wirt Blume and James Win.
Moore. Nevertheless, with deference to these great men, I think we
should refrain from agreeing that appellate courts are to do justice
until we have seen the price we must pay for this concept.
The principal consequences of broadening appellate review are
two. Such a course impairs the confidence of litigants and the public
in the decisions of the trial courts, and it multiplies the number of
appeals.1 1 7 Until recently if a defendant thought an award of damages was excessive, he nevertheless had no choice but to pay it, for
no appellate court would listen to his attack on it. Now, in similar
117 See the observation of the Eighth Circuit, in Pendergrass v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 181 F.2d 136, 138 (8th Cir. 1950), quoted p. 771 above.
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circumstances, he will appeal. Until recently if a lawyer was dissatisfied when his case was referred to a master, he appeared before
the master nevertheless, for an attempted appeal from the order of
reference would have been dismissed out of hand. Now he files a
petition for a writ of mandamus. We may be sure that the broadened
scope of appellate review we have seen will mean an increase in the
number of appeals. 118 Is this desirable? We need not worry too
much that an increase in appeals will mean overwork for appellate
judges, they, after all, have invited the increase. But we should
worry about the consequences of more numerous appeals for the
litigants and the public. Appeals are always expensive and timeconsuming. When they are successful, and lead to a new trial, they
add to the burden on already-crowded trial courts. Interlocutory
review, as by writ of mandamus, delays the case interminably while
the lawyers go off to the appellate court to argue the propriety of
the challenged order by the trial judge. It is literally marvelous that,
at a time when the entire profession is seeking ways to minimize
congestion and delay in the courts, we should set on a course which
inevitably must increase congestion and delay
But we have courts in order to do justice. If better justice can
be obtained by broadening the scope of appellate review, then even
congestion, delay and expense are not too high a price to pay Do
we really get better justice by augmenting the power of the appellate courts? In some fairly obvious senses I feel quite sure that we
do not. If in two similar cases the person rich enough to afford an
appeal gets a reversal, however just, while the person of insufficient
means to risk an appeal is forced to live with the judgment of the
trial court, has justice really been improved? And what of the injured person who settles his claim for less than the amount awarded
him by the jury and approved by the trial court rather than wait a
year or more until an appellate court has agreed that the verdict is
not excessive? Broader appellate review has led to injustice for him.
Further, it may well be, as Blackstone says, that "next to doing
right, the great object in the administration of public justice should
be to give public satisfaction." 11 ' It is hard to believe that there has
been any great public dissatisfaction with the restricted appellate
review which was traditional in this country Very early in our history Chief Justice Ellsworth observed
118. A usual means of reducing congestion in the appellate courts has
been to narrow the scope of review. For an excellent historical account, see
Frankfurter and Landis, The Supreme Court it October Term, 1929, 44 Harv.
L. Rev. 1, 26-35 (1930).
119. 3 B1. Comm. *391.
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But, surely, it cannot be deemed a denial of justice, that a man
shall not be permitted to try his case two or three times over.120
Yet increased review is likely to lead to quite tangible public dissatisfaction. Every time a trial judge is reversed, every time the belief
is reiterated that appellate courts are better qualified than trial judges
to decide what justice requires, the confidence of litigants and the
public in the trial courts will be further impaired. Under any feasible
or conceivable system, our trial courts must always have the last
word in the great bulk of cases. I doubt whether there will be much
satisfaction with the judgments of trial courts among a public which
is educated to believe that only appellate judges are trustworthy
miisters of justice.
Finally, to come to the very heart of the issue, is there any reason
to suppose that the result an appellate court reaches on the kinds of
issues discussed is more likely to be "just" than was the opposite
result reached by the trial court? Judge Chase's observation, quoted
earlier, is in point here.
Though trial judges may at times be mistaken as to facts, appellate
judges are not always omniscient.' 2'
Most of our examples have come from the federal courts, and federal
district judges are generally believed to be men of much ability,
rightly entitled to the greatest respect. In some of the states, it is
true, trial judges are not so highly regarded. But this is wrong, regardless of the scope of appellate review. I think there is wide agreement that trial judges should be picked with the same care as appellate judges, and that it probably would be desirable to give them the
same conditions of salary and tenure as are given appellate judges.,!If trial judges are carefully selected, as in the federal system, it
is hard to flunk of any reason why they are more likely to make
errors of judgment than are appellate judges. Where the question is
whether an award of damages is excessive or a verdict against the
clear weight of the evidence, the trial judge has the vast advantage
of having been present in the courtroom and heard the witnesses.
Where the question is as to the procedure to be followed in a pending
case, the trial judge has the advantage of having lived with the case,
and thus should be better able than the appellate judges to gauge its
120. Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 320, 329 (1796).

121. Orvis v. Higgms, 180 F.2d 537, 542 (2d Cir.), ccrt. denied, 340 U.S.
810 (1950).

122. Sunderland, Improvement of Appellate Procedure, 26 Iowa L. Rev.
3 (1940). And see Pound, Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases 380-81 (1941),

Calamandrei, Procedure and Democracy 42-44 (1956).
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complexity and its procedural needs. And even where the question
is what finding of fact should be made on the basis of documentary
evidence, the trial judge has the advantage of having made the initial
sifting of the entire record and of having put it into logical sequence,
while the appellate court has lawyers before it picking out bits and
pieces of the record to attack or defend a particular finding.
There is no way to know for sure whether trial courts or appellate courts are more often right. But in the absence of a clear showing that broadened appellate review leads to better justice, a showing
which I think has not been made and probably cannot be made, the
cost of increased appellate review, in terms of time and expense to
the parties, in terms of lessened confidence in the trial judge, and in
terms of positive injustice to those who cannot appeal, seems to me
clearly exorbitant.
I do not wish to speak critically of the appellate courts which
have recently announced broader powers of appellate review Only
the most insensitive observer could fail to sympathize with their
problem. When a judge upholds the constitutionality of a statute he
believes unwise, he has at least all the tradition of deference to a
coordinate and popularly responsible branch of government to sustain him in his self-restraint. But there is no such tradition to bolster
self-restraint when he is passing on the work of his consttutional
inferiors within the judiciary It must be hard, indeed, for a judge
to approve a judgment below he considers to be unjust when he
knows that he has the power to set it aside and achieve justice as he
sees it. Our hope must be that in those hard moments the judge will
remember Justice Jackson's caution that "we are not final because
we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final,"'
and that, remembering, he may believe that the best way to do justice in the long run is to confine to a minimum appellate tampering
with the work of the trial courts.
123. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (concurring opinion).
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